Brain Scans in the Courtroom: Analyzing the General Perception of fMRI Memory Reconstruction Evidence by Carlson, Emily Thérèse
BRAIN SCANS IN THE COURTROOM: ANALYZING THE
GENERAL PERCEPTION OF FMRI MEMORY
RECONSTRUCTION EVIDENCE
by
EMILY CARLSON
A THESIS
Presented to the Department of General Science 
and the Robert D. Clark Honors College 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
Bachelor of Science
June 2020
An Abstract of the Thesis of
Emily Carlson for the degree of Bachelor of Science
in the Department of General Science to be taken June 2020
Title: Brain Scans in the Courtroom: Analyzing the General Perception of fMRI
Memory Reconstruction Evidence
Approved: _________Dr. Nicole Dudukovic__________________
Primary Thesis Advisor
This thesis seeks to assess the public perception of a new functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) facial memory reconstruction technology and its potential 
future usage in creating facial composites that could serve as criminal evidence. To 
accomplish this, we presented participants with a facial composite posed as evidence in 
a hypothetical criminal court case. Participants read one of two accompanying 
descriptions of how that facial composite was developed: (1) with fMRI memory 
reconstruction technology that scanned the brain of an eyewitness, or (2) with modern 
computer software where the eyewitness built the facial composite from memory. In 
order to measure and compare the participants’ perception of the two facial composite 
techniques, we presented them with a picture of the suspect’s face along with the facial 
composite and asked them to rate the suspect’s guilt, their confidence that the facial 
composite was actually the suspect, and the degree of similarity between the facial 
composite and the suspect’s face. Though ratings for each question were higher in the 
fMRI condition compared with the computer software condition, implying a possible 
increased level of trust, none of the differences were statistically significant. These 
results, therefore, serve as good news for this developing fMRI technology, such that its
potential future usage in developing facial composites may not be subject to any 
harmful biases. 
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Introduction
Imagine that the year is 2025, and you get a letter in the mail summoning you 
for jury duty as Juror #45. When the day finally arrives, you get interviewed and 
assigned to a case dealing with an armed robbery at a local hardware store. While sitting
in the courtroom, you feel consumed by the tense, high-stakes environment of the trial. 
You see the beads of sweat rolling down the defendant’s face as they are clearly 
running through all the worst-case scenarios for themselves and envisioning their 
potential fate at a state prison. A few moments later, the prosecutor hands the jury a 
facial composite which looks a little bit like the defendant. While handing it over, the 
prosecutor explains that it was developed using new “state-of-the-art technology” that 
allows neuroscientists to reconstruct eyewitness facial memories based off of the results
of a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) brain scan. Given this piece of 
evidence, how would you feel about it? Would you feel compelled to trust it, knowing it
was developed directly from the eyewitness’s brain activity and memory of the culprit’s
face? 
The technology used to create that facial composite is still in the developing 
stages (Lee & Kuhl, 2016) and is certainly not yet ready to be used in a court of law.  
Assessing the ethical implications of its potential future usage, however, serves as a 
crucial aspect of its development process. Studies have already displayed the ethical 
pitfalls of using facial composites in the context of eyewitness testimony (Charman, 
Gregory, & Carlucci, 2009), and many have also looked at the compelling nature of 
neuroscientific jargon (Weisberg, Keil, Rawson, & Gray, 2008; Weisberg, Taylor, & 
Hopkins, 2015; Fernandez-Duque, Evans, Christian, & Hodges, 2015). Our study, 
however, assesses the perception and potential consequences of using fMRI to 
reconstruct facial memories, as modern memory reconstruction techniques will likely 
become increasingly prevalent in the courtroom.  
In this current study, we placed participants in the position of someone 
analyzing criminal evidence. From here, we tested for any persuasive effect that 
evidence may carry as a result of being derived from neuroscientific origins. By 
understanding public perception of fMRI evidence, both neuroscientists and those in a 
legal setting may better understand the ethical implications of bringing brain imaging 
technologies into the courtroom. Down the road, this could assist in generating 
guidelines on how this type of evidence should be used and presented in a trial, or if it 
should be used at all. 
The present study is not attempting to display the strengths of using fMRI to 
reconstruct facial memories, although this technology may have the potential to produce
quality facial composites that could potentially bypass various issues with current 
methods. Rather, the focus of the current research is to explore the perceptions of this 
technology and the potential implications of those perceptions, particularly in a 
courtroom setting. That way, when you are sitting in the juror’s seat and get handed that
facial composite, it is not a one-way ticket to jail for the defendant, but rather another 
piece of quality evidence that must be critically analyzed. 
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Background
Eyewitness testimony has traditionally been fraught with problems. According 
to a 2007 review by Wells and Hasel, facial composites can harm innocent suspects 
who may coincidentally look similar to the facial composite, thereby potentially 
resulting in false convictions. Additionally, eyewitnesses tend to identify suspects who 
resemble the composite that they created, rather than the original face they saw. This 
finding has vast implications, such that people may trust their often-faulty memory over
reality. The way people perceive and trust evidence greatly influences trial outcomes. 
Consequently, we are interested in assessing if people trust the fMRI-based memory 
reconstruction technique of the current study more than a fictitious non-fMRI 
counterpart. 
Additionally, a 2009 study by Charman et al. suggests that a preconceived belief
in a suspect’s guilt can lead mock-jurors to interpret facial composites as highly similar 
to an innocent suspect, thereby heightening beliefs in the suspect’s guilt. This may 
eventually lead to innocent people being wrongly convicted, perhaps also resulting in 
decreased efforts to identify the actual perpetrator. fMRI-based memory reconstructions
could bypass this issue if precision of the facial composite was increased so greatly that 
connection to anyone besides the actual perpetrator would be next to impossible. 
Conversely, however, and perhaps more likely, the fMRI-developed facial composite 
could inflate this issue if viewers of the image have unjustifiable trust in it merely due 
to its neuroscientific origins. 
Wells and Hasel (2007) also report that facial composites created by more 
traditional means, in which eyewitnesses build the composite themselves on an 
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individual-feature level or describe their facial memory to an artist, can lead to major 
inaccuracies in the resultant facial composite. This occurs as people likely understand 
and recall faces more holistically (rather than by individual features), thereby proving it 
difficult to build accurate facial composites when done so in pieces. Modern computer 
software programs that address this issue by building facial composites through a more 
whole-face approach do exist, however, and are utilized by police forces. EvoFIT©, for 
instance, builds faces as eyewitnesses first look at a pool of randomly generated faces, 
then choose the face that most closely resembles the face that they remember. This 
chosen face becomes the parent to a newly generated pool of mutations of the parent 
face. This process continues until the eyewitness cannot choose faces any further as 
they all equally resemble their memory (“How it Works?”, 2019). In 2010, EvoFIT was 
used by Humberside police and led to a 60% suspect identification rate (21 arrests from 
35 composites)—quadruple that of the previously used feature-based system, E-FIT 
(Frowd et al., 2012). Though this is evidently an improvement to traditional facial 
composite techniques, developing fMRI technology by Lee and Kuhl (2016) could go a 
step further by skipping the eyewitness description and artist completely, and instead 
only utilize the eyewitness’s brain activity.  
These fMRI-based reconstruction methods have been developing in stages. In 
2008, Kay, Naselaris, Prenger, and Gallant used a decoding technique defining the 
relationship between visual stimuli and fMRI activity to reconstruct an image from an 
observer’s visual experience and identify which picture was viewed from a set of 
completely novel images. These findings helped set the stage for memory 
reconstruction based on fMRI activity alone. Cowen, Chun, and Kuhl (2014), however, 
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first assessed if brain activity patterns were sufficient for reconstructing perceived facial
images. This was done by utilizing a machine learning algorithm to map identified 
facial components with fMRI activity collected from the viewing of different faces. 
Subsequent fMRI activity was used to predict component scores; these scores then got 
translated to reconstructed images. Lee and Kuhl (2016) then further developed the 
technology in an attempt to reconstruct facial memories, as opposed to perceived faces. 
Their study demonstrates that facial perceptions can be reliably reconstructed from the 
activity pattern in the occipitotemporal cortex as well as several lateral parietal 
subregions. This was accomplished by applying a principal component analysis to a set 
of face images in order to create eigenfaces. These eigenfaces were then associated with
various fMRI activity patterns such that predicted eigenface values could be used to 
reconstruct facial images. The current study seeks to assess the public perception of this
neuroscience-derived fMRI facial image reconstruction technology, particularly in the 
context of utilizing it to produce facial composite evidence in criminal cases. 
Just like most things in the world, neuroscience can easily be oversimplified and
over-trusted. Consequently, the ethical implications of its general perception must be 
critically analyzed. Weisberg et al. (2008) demonstrated that non-expert groups perceive
explanations containing neuroscience as more satisfying than explanations without it, 
even when the neuroscience information is irrelevant. Additionally, they found that in 
faulty explanations, the presence of neuroscience information can often mask the 
presence of otherwise obvious flaws in the explanation. Rhodes, Rodriquez, and Shah 
(2014) also found that when participants were reading news articles about scientific 
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studies, the presence of neuroscience information resulted in higher ratings of both the 
study quality and the article quality. 
Beyond just reading explanations, Ali, Lifshitz, and Raz (2014) assessed the 
overall trustworthiness of neuroscientific technology as they placed students in a mock 
neuroimaging device that supposedly decoded the participant’s resting brain activity 
and read their mind. The study found that the majority of participants believed the entire
paradigm, and that students who were enrolled in a psychology class focused on the 
shortcomings of neuroscience were only slightly more skeptical. This study points to 
the dangerous nature of neuroscience—where even those familiar with the field may be 
swayed by its allure and supposed abilities. 
In 2011, McCabe, Castel, Rhodes, and Ewing found that when potential jurors 
read vignettes of criminal cases where the criminal lies about committing the crime, the 
vignettes which contained fMRI lie detection evidence (rather than polygraph or 
thermal facial imaging lie detection evidence, or no lie detection evidence at all) lead to 
more guilty verdicts. Gurley and Marcus (2008) also found that for not guilty by reason 
of insanity defenses (NGRI), the presence of neuroimages and brain lesions led to fewer
guilty verdicts than those without neurological evidence, implying that the presence of 
brain-related evidence holds weight in a psychological testimony. These results suggest 
that jurors may trust evidence derived from fMRI technology merely due to the appeal 
of its origins. We are interested in seeing if fMRI-based memory reconstruction 
techniques will yield similar results, such that people trust a facial composite developed 
from fMRI technology more than a facial composite developed from modern computer 
software. 
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Collectively, these findings suggest that evidence derived via neuroscientific 
methods may be perceived as higher quality and more satisfying than their non-
neuroscientific counterparts. In the context of a trial, this could be very problematic. 
Hopkins et al. (2016), however, found that people are not swayed exclusively by 
neuroscience, but rather swayed by reductive reasoning in general, when it is placed in 
an explanation of some phenomena. So, perhaps an fMRI-developed facial composite 
would not actually be much more persuasive than an advanced facial composite derived
from another modern technique.
Aside from neuroscience jargon, the mere presence of brain images may inflict 
similar, if not stronger, biases. In a 2015 study, Weisberg and colleagues expanded on 
the seductive appeal of neuroscience from the Weisberg et al. (2008) study. The 
presence of neuroscience jargon was found as unnecessary for the biased results—the 
mere presence of brain images was compelling enough. McCabe and Castel (2008) 
found a similar effect of brain images—articles containing them were rated as better 
written and containing better scientific reasoning than those without brain images. 
Additionally, the presence of brain images also increased ratings of agreement with the 
articles’ conclusions. Given that fMRI scans produce brain images (though not used 
directly as the facial composite), these results are pertinent to our study. 
Interestingly, however, Fernandez-Duque et al. (2014) found that the presence 
of superfluous neuroscientific jargon increased the perceived quality of a psychological 
explanation, but the presence of a brain image had negligible effects. Michael, 
Newman, Vuorre, Cumming, and Garry (2013) also found that the presence of brain 
images had little to no effect on the perceived credibility of accompanying information 
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and Schweitzer, Saks, Murphy, Roskies, Sinnott-Armstrong, and Gaudet (2011) found 
that neuroimages caused no effect on jury verdicts within NGRI defenses. Similarly, 
Hook and Farah (2013) observed that fMRI images did add appeal to research 
descriptions, but not due to scientific reasoning. In fact, when compared to non-brain-
image photographs, fMRI images only improved interest levels, rather than scientific 
reasoning, surprise, innovation, or worthiness of funding. These results, though 
somewhat conflicting, exemplify that the presence of neuroscientific information and 
brain images may have compelling effects. The line between how advanced 
neuroscience information or image needs to seem in order to inflict bias remains 
inconsistent and unclear. By assessing whether fMRI-based facial composites elicit a 
compelling effect, our research will help to define that boundary.
If our study does find that people place more trust in an fMRI-based facial 
composite, it will support prior findings that suggest a compelling effect of fMRI 
technology, brain images, or just neuroscientific information in general. Consequently, 
it would become even more clear how critical it is to use neuroscientific technology, 
such as fMRI-based memory reconstruction, with caution and to assess its general 
perception prior to use in a non-research setting.  
Existing research implies that a seductive allure may revolve around 
neuroscience in some sense or another. Through our research, we hope to better 
understand whether those biases exist within the context of fMRI facial memory 
reconstruction technology. To do this, we presented participants with a hypothetical 
crime scenario and a corresponding facial composite labeled as being based on the 
eyewitness’s memory. In order to accurately assess the perception of this technology at 
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its current stage in development, the facial composite used was an actual facial 
reconstruction image produced by Lee and Kuhl (2016). The facial composite was 
accompanied by one of two possible descriptions of how it was developed: (1) through 
this newly developing fMRI technology, which reconstructs the eyewitness’ memory of 
the culprit based on their brain activity patterns, or (2) with a modern computer 
software, which allows eyewitnesses to build their own facial composite based on their 
memories. After participants viewed the facial composites, we measured their reactions 
using a questionnaire, and through that, compared their “levels of trust” in the facial 
composites. We hypothesized that participants would be biased towards having more 
trust in the fMRI-developed facial composite. Our hypothesis was based on the study by
McCabe et al. (2011), who found that potential jurors were swayed by lie detection 
evidence when it was based on fMRI images. That study suggests that references to 
fMRI technology may compel the public and add an extra layer of trust. We are 
interested in assessing whether or not the reference to fMRI technology with regard to 
this developing facial memory reconstruction method would sway the public—
particularly jurors—to an unwarranted and problematic degree.  
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Methods
Participants
For the in-person version of our study, one-hundred and thirteen University of 
Oregon undergraduate students recruited from the Human Subjects Pool participated in 
the study. All of these participants partook in a separate, existing study within the Kuhl 
Lab for credit and completed our in-person survey afterwards. For the online version of 
our study, three-hundred and nine University of Oregon undergraduate students enrolled
in one of two introductory psychology courses completed the survey for credit online 
via Qualtrics. Online participants were between the ages of 18 and 44 years (average 
age = 19.5) with 156 participants identifying as female, 76 as male, and 2 participants 
identifying as non-binary or self-described. In terms of ethnicity, 156 participants 
identified as white, 34 as Asian, 25 as Hispanic origin, 7 as mixed or other ethnicity or 
origin, 6 as African American, 2 as Middle Eastern or North African, 2 preferred not to 
answer, 1 as American Indian or Alaska Native, and 1 as Native Hawaiian or other 
Pacific Islander. 75 participants in the online Qualtrics study did not report any 
demographic information due to an error by the survey administrator. One participant 
for the Qualtrics study was not included in the data as they provided a rating outside the
given range. 
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Materials
For both versions of the study, we created the following hypothetical crime 
scenario: 
A few weeks ago, an armed robbery took place at the cash register of a 
small, family-owned hardware store. The cashier of the shop witnessed the 
crime and was able to get a good look at the perpetrator. The robber ran away 
soon after the crime, and the cashier immediately called the police. From this 
cashier’s memory of the robber, a facial composite was developed. Since then, a
suspect has been identified and is now being held at the police station.
We selected the “facial composite” image, as well as the “suspect” image from Lee and 
Kuhl (2016). The facial composite is an actual facial memory reconstruction produced 
by the researchers using this technique, and the suspect image is a photograph of the 
corresponding face.
We wrote two descriptions of how the facial composite was developed, whether 
through fMRI (condition “F”) or a fictitious computer software named “fCIS” 
(condition “C”). The two descriptions had the same word count to avoid subjects being 
persuaded by length. Additionally, both of the descriptions only differed in the part that 
states whether the facial composite was developed via fMRI or fCIS in order to avoid 
subjects being swayed by other scientific jargon or explanations that are not consistent 
across both descriptions. The two descriptions read as follows:
Description for the fMRI “F” Condition:
The above facial composite was developed using a new state-of-the-art facial composite
technique. With this technology, neuroscientists are able to reconstruct eyewitness’ 
memories of a perpetrator’s face based on the results of a brain scanning technique 
called Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI). While in the fMRI scanner, the 
cashier was instructed to make consecutive attempts to recall their memory of the 
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perpetrator’s face, and a computer algorithm selected a set of faces from a large 
database that most closely matched the cashier’s brain activity pattern. This resultant 
collection of faces resembling the perpetrator was then morphed into a single face to 
compute and build the above facial composite.
Description for the Computer “C” Condition:
The above facial composite was developed using a new state-of-the-art facial composite
technique. With this technology, eyewitnesses are able to reconstruct their memories of 
a perpetrator’s face based on the results of a computer software program called Face 
Composite Imaging System (fCIS). While using the fCIS program, the cashier was 
instructed to make consecutive attempts to recall their memory of the perpetrator’s 
face, and the cashier selected a set of faces from a large database that most closely 
matched their memory of the perpetrator’s face. This resultant collection of faces 
resembling the perpetrator was then morphed into a single face to compute and build 
the above facial composite.
For the fMRI condition, the description was a simplified explanation of how this
real technique works, lacking any of the technical details. For the computer condition, 
the description was of a fictitious software, reflecting the use of actual modern 
computer software which allows eyewitnesses to build their own facial composites from
a bank of facial features (“How it Works?”, 2019). Primarily, we aimed to have the two 
conditions differ in whether the facial image was developed directly from the 
eyewitness’ brain activity, or if it was developed by the eyewitness recalling the face 
from their memory of the crime. This allowed us to test whether the mere fact that the 
image was developed from brain activity and brain imaging is inherently compelling 
(where the computer condition serves as the control), and thus gain a better 
understanding of the compelling nature of neuroscience.
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Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to either the fMRI condition, or to the 
computer software (control) condition. All participants first read the on-screen 
hypothetical crime scenario. Immediately after, the participants were prompted to look 
at the facial composite image that was displayed on the computer screen. The 
participant then read the description of how that facial composite was developed; half of
the subjects read the description of the fMRI condition, and the other half read the 
description of the computer condition. For both conditions, the description was 
displayed on the computer screen. Next, participants were prompted to again look at the
computer screen, but this time it was a side-by-side of the suspect image (a real 
photograph labeled as “Suspect”) as well as the same facial composite that they saw just
prior. Participants then read a series of questions and responded by choosing a number 
on a 7-point Likert scale (1 representing the most negative response, and 7 representing 
the most positive response). 
Initially, when we were piloting this experiment, we had only two questions for 
the participants: one that assessed their perception of how similar the facial composite 
seemed to the suspect’s face (1=extremely dissimilar, 7=extremely similar) and one that
assessed their confidence that the facial composite was actually of the suspect whose 
face was displayed on the computer screen (1=extremely unconfident, 7=extremely 
confident). Participants also had the opportunity to answer a more open-ended question 
that asked them if they noticed anything throughout the study that they wished to 
comment on. 
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For the initial, pilot round of data collection, the descriptions and questionnaire 
part of the study were on paper, while the two images were on the computer screen. The
participants were also the ones to fill out the questionnaire sheet. After some issues 
were observed (participants did not seem to consider the description when answering 
the questions and instead just hyper-analyzed the side-by-side images of the suspect’s 
face and the facial composite on the computer screen), we adjusted the final procedure 
of the in-person study and put it all on a Microsoft PowerPoint presentation which was 
displayed on a computer screen. We also added another question (which was posed as 
the first question) and switched the order of the other two questions. The new question 
assessed how likely the participant believes the suspect to be guilty of the crime 
(1=extremely unlikely, 7=extremely likely), similar to the data collected by McCabe et 
al. (2011). In both the in-person and the online study, participants first answered the 
guilt question, then the confidence question, and lastly the similarity question (see 
Appendix).
For the in-person study, instead of having the participant fill out the 
questionnaire themselves while looking at the computer screen, the researcher 
transcribed their responses onto a paper questionnaire recording sheet. Additionally, in 
order to remind participants of how the facial composite was developed, we labeled the 
facial composite as either “Computer software composite” or “Brain imaging 
composite.” Lastly, instead of having the images separate from the questions, we had 
each question on a separate slide, each of which was displayed underneath the repeating
side-by-side of the suspect image and facial composite. Figure 1 is an example of a slide
for the fMRI condition, question #1:
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Figure 1: An example slide for the fMRI condition of the in-person study, question #1 
(guilt question).
For all data collection taking place within the Kuhl Lab, results were collected 
via paper and pencil. Once we put the study into the general psychology survey, data 
were collected via Qualtrics. For this online study, participants were asked the same 
questions, and presented the same images (still labeled as “Suspect,” “Brain imaging 
composite,” and “Computer software composite”), but in order to remotely assess their 
engagement and acknowledgement of the independent variable, participants were also 
asked how the facial composite was developed. This question was constructed as a 
manipulation check and read as follows: “How was the facial composite developed? 
Please briefly describe below.” 
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Results
Once data collection was completed, the data were analyzed using Microsoft 
Excel and SPSS. We computed the mean guilt, confidence, and similarity ratings for the
two conditions, as well as their corresponding standard deviations. For each rating, we 
also calculated the proportion of participants who answered with a positive rating (5-7), 
negative rating (1-3), and an overall neutral rating (4). To determine whether there were
differences between the two conditions for each rating, we ran unpaired equal variance 
t-tests. We assessed the interdependency of condition and rating (positive, negative, or 
neutral) with chi-square tests. Here, we only report analyses for all data combined (in-
person and Qualtrics), but we also ran separate analyses for the data collected from the 
in-person study and the data collected from the Qualtrics study. The pattern of data and 
statistical results from those separate analyses were highly similar to the results from 
the combined data. 
We first compared the mean ratings for the guilt question (“How likely do you 
think it is that the suspect is guilty?”), confidence question (“How confident are you 
that the person represented by the facial composite is the suspect?”), and similarity 
question (“How similar is the facial composite to the suspect’s face?”) between 
conditions. As shown in Table 1, for each of these three questions, the mean rating was 
higher in the fMRI condition than in the computer condition, as predicted by our 
hypothesis. However, none of these differences were statistically significant. Guilt 
ratings were numerically higher in the fMRI condition (M = 3.90, SD = 1.65) than in the
computer condition (M = 3.74, SD = 1.56), but this failed to reach statistical 
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significance, t < 1, p = .331. For the confidence ratings, the numbers were again higher 
in the fMRI condition (M = 3.56, SD = 1.67) than in the computer condition (M = 3.42, 
SD = 1.50), but again did not reach statistical significance, t < 1, p = .360. Lastly, the 
similarity ratings followed the same pattern, where ratings were not statistically 
significantly higher in the fMRI condition (M = 3.64, SD = 1.74) than in the computer 
condition (M = 3.58, SD = 1.59), t < 1, p = .732 (Table 1). 
Table 1: Average ratings (out of 7) for each question compared between the computer 
and fMRI condition.
Condition N Guilty
Rating
Confidence   
Rating
Similarity 
Rating
Computer 219 3.74 3.42 3.58
fMRI 203 3.90 3.56 3.64
Note that N differs across each condition. N total = 422.
To assess the interdependency between condition and rating, we compared the 
proportion of participants for each condition who rated each question as negative (1-3), 
neutral (4), or positive (5-7). We then ran a chi-square test (Tables 2-4) but observed no 
statistical significance and therefore no dependency between condition and rating. For 
the guilt question, those in the fMRI condition were more likely to report that the 
suspect was guilty, as predicted by our hypothesis, but this failed to reach statistical 
significance, X2 (2, N = 422) = 3.59, p = 0.166 (Table 2). Similarly, for the confidence 
question, those in the fMRI condition were more likely to report confidence in the facial
composite being of the imaged suspect as we hypothesized, but this too failed to reach 
statistical significance, X2 (2, N = 422) = 3.798, p = 0.15 (Table 3). Lastly, for the 
similarity question, those in the fMRI condition were again more likely to report 
positive values where they rated the facial composite as appearing similar to the suspect
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image as we hypothesized, but not to a degree that was statistically significant, X2 (2, N
= 422) = 4.042, p = 0.133 (Table 4). We also did a chi-square test for both the in-person
and online studies separately, but the pattern remained close to the same and almost no 
statistical significance was found. The one exception was the chi-square test for the 
confidence question in the in-person study, which did reach statistical significance, X2 
(2, N = 113) = 8.360, p = 0.015. Participants in the fMRI condition were more likely to 
express confidence that the facial composite was the suspect than participants in the 
computer condition (.32 vs. .10 were the respective proportions). Because these results 
were so different than the results from the confidence question for the online Qualtrics 
study (p = 0.761), we suspect that this could be a statistical fluke rather than an actual 
indication of biases. 
Table 2: Comparison of the proportion of negative, neutral, and positive responses to 
the guilty question.
Not Guilty Neutral Guilty
Computer .39 .28 .32
fMRI .39 .21 .39
N total = 422.
Table 3: Comparison of the proportion of negative, neutral, and positive responses to 
the confidence question.
Not
Confident
Neutral Confident
Computer .48 .27 .25
fMRI .44 .23 .33
N total = 422.
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Table 4: Comparison of the proportion of negative, neutral, and positive responses to 
the similarity question.
Not Similar Neutral Similar
Computer .43 .27 .29
fMRI .47 .19 .34
N total = 422.
For the online Qualtrics study, we also examined responses to the manipulation 
check question (“How was the facial composite developed? Please briefly describe 
below.”). We rated responses on a 3-point scale, where 1 = incorrect, 2 = partially 
correct, and 3 = correct. Responses scored a 1 if the participant completely ignored, 
misinterpreted, or incorrectly answered the question. Responses scored a 2 if they were 
on the right track but failed to state the precise method of facial composite 
development. To receive a 3, responses had to explicitly and accurately state the facial 
composite development method (e.g. “fMRI,” “fCIS,” “modern computer technology,” 
“brain scanner,” etc.), confirming that they were aware of their level of the independent 
variable. Interestingly, 64.6% of participants in the fMRI condition scored a 3, while 
only 48.1% in the computer (fCIS) group scored a 3. After sorting the responses based 
on score, we calculated mean guilt, confidence, and similarity ratings for each condition
including only the responses that scored a 3 on the manipulation check. Similar to the 
pattern observed with the combined data, the mean rating for each condition increased 
from the computer group to the fMRI group, but still no statistical significance was 
found (ps > .1). We also ran chi-square tests for this collection of data, but again found 
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a similar pattern to the combined data; for each question (guilt, confidence, and 
similarity), those in the fMRI condition were more likely to provide positive ratings. 
This trend, too, however, did not reach statistical significance (ps > .1). 
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Discussion
This study aimed to assess the public perception of a new functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) facial memory reconstruction technology and its potential 
future usage in creating facial composites that could serve as criminal evidence. Results 
demonstrate that the average ratings were in the hypothesized direction where the 
average guilt rating was numerically higher when participants thought the facial 
composite came from an eyewitness’s brain activity compared with when they thought 
the composite was generated using computer software. Similarly, participants were 
slightly more confident that the facial composite was the suspect and rated the two 
images as more similar when they thought the composite was generated using fMRI. 
This numerical pattern, particularly that of the guilt question, is consistent with the 
findings of McCabe, Castel, Rhodes, and Ewing (2011) who found that fMRI-based 
evidence (in their case, lie detection evidence) led to a greater number of guilty verdicts 
by mock-jurors than evidence created by non-fMRI techniques. However, the null 
hypothesis for our current study was ultimately supported as none of these differences 
were statistically significant. Consequently, these statistically insignificant findings may
align more strongly with those of Schweitzer et al. (2011) who found that neuroimages 
caused no effect on jury verdicts with NGRI defenses. 
It was also illustrated that for the guilt, confidence, and similarity question, a 
greater proportion of participants in the fMRI condition reported the suspect as guilty, 
were confident that the facial composite was of the suspect, and rated the facial 
composite as looking similar to the suspect image, respectively. These trends, however, 
again failed to reach statistical significance. Interestingly, results across both conditions 
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illustrate that participants were generally skeptical of the facial composite; for all three 
questions, each of the average ratings fell below 4 (never surpassing a neutral average 
rating). This may be due to a limitation of the study design itself, however, as the 
pattern was consistent across conditions. 
Though the results did not support our hypothesis, the lack of statistical 
significance and therefore absence of increasing trust in the fMRI-based facial 
composite may serve as good news for this new fMRI facial memory reconstruction 
technology. If the public is not actually compelled by this fMRI technology, then 
perhaps using it in a criminal trial as a means of creating evidence will be a safe 
procedure and not elicit biases, specifically within the jury. Though this fMRI facial 
memory reconstruction could bypass some of the issues with current facial composite 
techniques (i.e., bridge the gap between remembering a face and actually recreating that
memory), it remains subject to the often-flawed eyewitness memory. Due to this, a 
healthy amount of skepticism is necessary in order to perceive this facial composite 
technique critically. Luckily, the generally low ratings given by participants to all three 
questions suggest that this skepticism may exist.
Despite the null hypothesis being supported, however, neuroscientists and those 
in a legal setting may still want to approach this technology with caution. Since the 
pattern of our data was in the hypothesized direction, it is possible that our sample size 
served as a limitation in our study and that with a larger sample size, the discrepancies 
would have reached statistical significance. 
More likely, our manipulation may not have been strong enough. In particular, 
the image we used as the facial composite may have served as a limitation in our study. 
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Since we aimed to accurately portray the technology at its current stage in development,
we used an actual facial memory reconstruction image from the Lee and Kuhl (2016) 
study. This facial image, however, may have appeared too unrealistic to elicit a 
compelling effect. It seemed that participants were often distracted by the differences 
between the facial composite and the suspect image rather than taking the independent 
variable (i.e., method of facial composite development) into account. This was evident 
in some of the answers to the manipulation check question for the online survey. For 
many of the responses which were scored as “incorrect,” participants commented on the
quality of the facial composite as well as any differences they noticed between it and 
the suspect image rather than answering the actual question. Using a different image for
the facial composite that more closely resembles the suspect image may lead to 
participants being more impacted by the description of how the facial composite was 
developed, and thus being more compelled by the fMRI-based technique. 
In order to prevent experimental confounds, we also carefully controlled the 
description of how the facial composites were created with regards to both length and 
language. Though this was a necessary step to take in order to test the effect of only the 
independent variable, it may have inadvertently led to the fMRI-based description 
standing out less than it would in a more authentic courtroom setting. This is something 
to be cautious of when moving forward with research as the effect may be stronger in a 
study that more closely mimics a courtroom setting. 
Additionally, differences between the in-person study and the online study may 
have skewed results. While participants in the in-person study were accompanied by a 
researcher who watched them complete the survey, participants in the online survey 
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were alone and thus may have felt less pressure to thoroughly read the description of 
how the facial composite was developed as well as each of the questions. If this lack of 
incentive did exist, it may have skewed the data and led to ratings which demonstrate a 
less compelling effect. Even in the in-person study, however, the results failed to reach 
statistical significance thereby suggesting only negligible effects elicited by this 
possible lack of incentive.  
If we were to design a follow-up to this study, we would likely use a larger 
sample size to see if this alters the results or brings the current pattern to statistical 
significance. Additionally, we could use a different image for the facial composite that 
more closely resembles the suspect image to see if this allows for the independent 
variable to more greatly affect participant responses. Lastly, we could convert the study 
to exclusively take place in-person in order to create a more consistent environment for 
participants and increase the incentive for them to complete the entire survey. If these 
adjustments were to lead to statistically significant results where participants were 
biased towards the fMRI condition, it would be interesting to complete another follow-
up study where we question the validity of the fMRI technique. McCabe et al. (2011) 
found that when the validity of fMRI lie detection evidence was questioned, fewer 
guilty verdicts were given by the mock-jurors. This information would be valuable in 
the context of our study, particularly for developing guidelines on how this new fMRI 
facial memory reconstruction technique should be presented in a court of law, and if 
certain tactics like questioning its validity help to alleviate any biases. 
Overall, the results of this current study support the null hypothesis and 
therefore indicate that in its current state, this new fMRI facial memory reconstruction 
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technique does not need to spark alarm within the legal field in regard to any biases it 
may elicit when used to develop facial composites as criminal evidence. Though not 
statistically significant, the average ratings were consistently higher in the fMRI 
condition, thereby implying that researchers and those in a court of law should still 
approach this technology with some level of caution and strongly consider conducting 
further research on the topic. 
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Appendix
Below are the questions presented to participants in both the in-person and 
online studies:
How likely do you think it is that the suspect is guilty? (circle the number on the 
scale)
How confident are you that the person represented by the facial composite is the 
suspect? (circle the number on the scale)
How similar is the facial composite to the suspect’s face? (circle the number on the 
scale)
Do you have any thoughts regarding this task that you would like to comment on? 
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        1            2    3 4 5 6         7
Extremely
Likely
Neither
Unlikely nor
Likely
Somewhat
Unlikely
UnlikelyExtremely
Unlikely
LikelySomewhat
Likely
        1 2       3          4 5            6          7
Extremely
Confident
ConfidentSomewhat
Confident
Neither
Unconfident
nor
Confident
Somewhat
Unconfident
UnconfidentExtremely 
Unconfident
     1 2          3    4  5       6              7
Extremely
Dissimilar
Extremely
Similar
SimilarSomewhat
Similar
Neither
Dissimilar
nor Similar
Somewhat
Dissimilar
Dissimilar
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